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ORGANIZATIONAL CLIMATE BUILDING AND CULTURAL INTEGRATION IN COALITION WARFARE

BY

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ORGANIZATIONAL CLIMATE BUILDING AND CULTURE INTEGRATION IN COALITION WARFARE

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ABSTRACT

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Global changes in military affairs clearly predicate that U.S. strategic leaders must make a paradigm shift in the way they intend to prosecute warfare in the 21st Century. This study examines the relevance or value of organizational climate-building in a joint, multinational alliance or coalition environment. It argues that strategic leaders will be more successful if they focus on climate-building and culture integration, rather than on development of organizational culture. More importantly, organizational culture-building is a long term proposition, a condition which does not support operations with transient organizations in a geostrategic environment. This paper applies findings in studies of high performing organizations to current strategic affairs. Moreover, it takes into account strategic lessons learned in coalition and alliance operations from World War I to Operation Desert Storm.

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INTRODUCTION

"We are already on the launch pad of the Twenty-First Century, and the countdown has begun. You will be both passenger and pilot on the organizational ride into the next millennium. You are the empowered managers, leaders, and professionals who will make it work."

Dungling and Matejka, "A Manager's Guide To The Millennium"

As we launch into the Post Cold War Era, we see greater emphasis on Joint

Service warfighting interdependence as codified by the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols,

Department of Defense Reorganization Act and Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint

Operations. Joint Publication 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States,
observes that, "As we consider the nature of warfare in the modern era, we find that it is
synonymous with Joint Warfare." More importantly, multinational alliance or coalition
warfare is now an integral part of the 'American Way of War' and the wave of the future.

Operation Desert Storm offers prima-facie evidence of how the U.S. intends to wage
future warfare. This paper will examine the value or relevance of organizational climatebuilding and culture integration in a geostrategic environment.

In <u>Principles for Coalition Warfare</u>, Gen. R.W. Riscassi asserts that, "Almost every time military forces have deployed from the United States, it has been a member of most often lead-coalition operations." The history of joint and multinational operations dates back as far as the Revolutionary War. But the critical debut of coalition warfare abroad emerged in World War I, when coalition operations were not well-coordinated and lacked synergy. The coalition's strategic leaders responded only to their own National Command Authority. Moreover, unity of effort was impeded because there was no single command and control structure. The personal antipathy that coalition leaders reflected in

their relationships prohibited the necessary close coordination and synchronization to best accomplish the mission. ³ One such example was the parochialism that created tension between the U.S. and French during the Meuse-Argonne Offensive in 1918. Both the Americans and French wanted to liberate Sedan. So, General Pershing launched an attack within the French boundary to capture Sedan. However, the French authorities communicated their displeasure, so General Pershing held back in favor of respecting their need to take Sedan to dispel the bad memories of the Franco-Prussian war. Because of Pershing's concessions, the French captured Sedan and restored their national pride. ⁴ World War I was only the 'tip of the iceberg' for the interpersonal and intrapersonal dynamics of future coalition warfare.

General Eisenhower led one of the largest, major coalition efforts during World War II, Operation Overlord. Eisenhower was selected over more seasoned wartime veterans because of his interpersonal, diplomatic, motivational and integrative skills. His unique abilities forged a coalition into a united team, as he had previously done in North Africa, Sicily and Italy. Even so, controversy and strained relationships ensued between the U.S. and its allies during Overlord. Senior leaders' ego, parochialism, and lust for glory all detracted from coalition efforts. However, Eisenhower was able to minimize these distractions without national bias. Overlord was a success story in coalition operations; it exhibited a closeness and maturity in political and military operations never before experienced.⁵ Eisenhower had cast the die for future coalition warfare.

The 1991 Operation Desert Storm was a monumentally successful coalition operation, because of its unity of effort and unity of command. Nonetheless, organizational climate-building among the coalition was somewhat lacking and required

the institution of parallel command structures.⁶ (Personal interview with Desert Storm participant who chose to remain anonymous)

Since the United States has vowed to continue to engage in future warfare as part of a joint, multinational or coalition force in the global community, future strategic leaders will continue to face unique leadership challenges beyond the scope of those in past history. According to Harback and Keller:

We are not only projecting into the future, as we did in the past, but we are finding that the future is rushing headlong into the present. That future is an open-ended vortex in which there is a multitude of complex, ill-defined landscapes...events, occurrences, relationships, challenges and opportunities, each with multiple layers, directions and velocities.⁷

The global community can be viewed as a dynamic prism which will oblige U.S. strategic leaders to think and act from a joint, multinational perspective. Their operating environment will unequivocally be more complex and fluid; it will demand greater interdependence. Future strategic leaders have a yeoman's task to lead, manage, and shape the organizational climate for culturally diverse groups. They must integrate ad hoc organizations, joining partners with different military paradigms, mores, values, and national identities. To further complicate the environment, many nations do not always share the same intent upon entering the alliance or coalition. Even so, U.S. strategic leaders of future coalitions will still be held accountable by the U.S. government for executing the mission to exacting standards. More than anything else, the global community looks to the U.S. military to assume a dominant leadership role in molding coalitions into an effective fighting force.

Organizational climate-building in a geostrategic environment requires a great deal of effort. It also raises thought provoking questions: What must be accomplished by the strategic leader to develop a positive organizational climate for ad hoc, joint, multinational or coalition forces? What are the operational imperatives that serve as the compass to show strategic leaders <a href="https://doi.org/10.1001/journal.org/10.1

The present is the prologue to the future: The countdown has begun, Have You Noticed? ... Just as there are great threats in the current and future organizational climates, there are also exciting possibilities and opportunities. Some things are predictable; some trends can be easily spotted and reliably extended into the future.⁸

This strategic research study will examine five areas to determine the value or relevance of organizational climate-building and culture integration in coalition warfare for the 21st Century. First, it will set the conceptual framework by examining culture, culture integration and organizational climate. Second, it will examine the relationship between high-performing units and organizational climate. Third, it will describe the organizational challenges for success on the joint, multinational alliance or coalition battlefield. Fourth, it will demonstrate how organizational climate contributes to unit readiness and performance. Last, it will recommend how senior-level leaders should elicit cooperation to build or engineer a positive organizational climate to integrate cultural diversity.

This study begins with an examination of culture and culture integration and organizational climate.

Culture and Culture Integration

An organization's <u>culture</u> establishes the social or operational paradigm in which the organization performs its task requirements: It is ... "a grouping of assumptions, values, norms and beliefs deeply embraced by members of the organization; it relates to how the organization relates to its environment: submitting, dominating, harmonizing, or finding a safe niche."

In 'Super-Leadership', Manz and Sims argue that culture is most relevant to more permanent or fixed organizations. However, it does not fulfill all the purposes and meet the requirements germane to integrate more transient organizations in a joint, multinational alliance or coalition environment. In short, organizational culture development is a long term proposition. Van Maanen and Barley (1985) indicate that "organizational culture leads them to argue that it would be rare, though not impossible, that an organization would have a unified culture." Therefore, the integration of these diverse cultures, not their unification is key to get the biggest 'Bang for the Buck'.

<u>Culture integration</u> is a key area of concern in a joint environment. It focuses on bringing diverse cultures together toward a common goal. Within the U.S. military, there are cultural differences between the services. In The Mask of War, Carl H. Builder describes five faces of service personalities to reveal differences rather than similarities among the services: "(1) Altars for Worship (2) Concerns with self-measurement (3) Preoccupation with toys versus the arts, (4) Degrees and extent of intraservice (or branch) distinction and (5) Insecurity about service legitimacy and relevance." Builder contends

that different U.S. military services bring to the table preconceived notions and ideas about how to best accomplish the military's strategic and operational objectives.

Despite these differences, the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols, Department of Defense Reorganization Act promulgates joint U.S. military operations to bring these forces together synergistically toward a common goal. Furthermore, to set up the strategic context for success while operating with multinational military forces, the strategic leader must understand, internalize, and be sensitive to national cultural differences, national biases, cross-national antagonisms between and among group members, as well as unusual administrative and bureaucratic processes. ¹² In a multinational environment there will be work-ethic differentials that may create tension and morale problems for all parties. ¹³ For example, some nations are accustomed to working short duty days and enjoying extended lunch breaks, while others do not subscribe to or identify with this cultural norm. Some countries encourage collectivism, rather than the American penchant for individualistic thought. U.S. strategic leaders in the future need to be aware of and sensitive to these issues.

Having examined culture and culture integration, let us now examine organizational climate, a term often confused with organizational culture.

Organizational Climate

Gilmer (1964) asserts that organizational climate is a multidimensional perception of the essential attributes or character of an organizational system: "It is a relatively enduring quality of the internal environment of an organization that (a) is experienced by its members, (b) influences their behavior, and (c) can be described in terms of the values

of a particular set of characteristics of the Organization."¹⁴ Additionally, researcher S.B. Sells observes that, the term organizational climate calls to mind a number of associations which at first glance suggest that the definition should be a relatively easy matter and consensus of responsible expectations to include: "the terms open and closed, applied to the presence or absence of perceived barriers to freedom of expression; terms such as tense, happy, busy, friendly, reflecting member behavior, and related terms such as warm, cold and impersonal, used to describe the atmosphere of organizational situations; and terms such as task oriented, production-oriented, employee-centered, and the like, used to describe management style or its equivalent in various organizations."¹⁵

Organizational climate-building and culture integration are key components to ensure cohesion in a multinational or coalition environment. Dwight D. Eisenhower claimed that:

Allied commands depend on mutual confidence. How is mutual confidence developed? You don't command it... By development of common understanding of the problems, by approaching these things on the widest possible basis with respect to each others opinions, and above all, through the development of friendships, this confidence is gained in families and allied staffs. ¹⁶

Although some future strategic leaders may tend to focus their energy on building a foundation for a healthy long-term organizational culture, they are as well charged with the responsibility to foster a positive organizational climate. A positive organizational climate should be the first step to build a constituency, which then provides a solid foundation for cohesive multinational operations. To ensure a positive environment, strategic leaders must encourage positive interaction among their subordinates, allies, coalition partners; they must foster the value of building productive relationships. They

must develop rapport with the top military leaders of the supporting multinational forces. Mutual respect and the willingness to make workable compromises are the cornerstones of a strong team and positive organizational climate. Strategic leaders cannot foster this environment if healthy interpersonal relationships are not valued. More important, the strategic leader contributes to a positive organizational climate when his or her behavior reflects competence and exhibits the underlying values, beliefs, and assumptions of the organization. Finally, if there are drastic shifts in the organization's climate or if the climate is persistently negative, this uncertainty or negativism destroys the trust and confidence of the organization's members and adversely affects organizational effectiveness and readiness. In Masters of The Art of Command, Martin Blumenson and James L. Stokesbury based the following assertion on American experiences during WWII:

... coalition warfare imposes certain restrictions on commanders. In a sense, allied warfare compels commanders to act in accordance with a set of manners somewhat different from what is expected on the battlefield. The coalition commander needs understanding, and sensitivity of a special sort. If he is lacking in these and cannot change his behavior patterns, if he is not inclined to respect a point of view valid to one of his allies, he is not likely to gain cohesion and combination in his forces in the degree normally required for success. ¹⁹

This suggests the need for strategic leaders to understand the dynamics of organizational climate-building and culture integration on coalition operations; these dynamics may have "spill over effects" on the coalitions' ultimate performance.

Relationship Between High-Performing Units and Organizational Climate

There is a direct correlation between high-performing organizations and a positive organizational climate. The strategic leader who applies sound leadership principles and

practices will generate a dynamic energy which bolsters a positive organizational climate and subsequently develops a long-term positive organizational culture. John Brodie, a former quarterback of the San Francisco 49ers football team, provides some insight into exceptional organizational energy with his description of a time when his team rose above their normal playing capacity. He recalls:

...When you have eleven men who know each other very well and have every ounce of their attention-and intention-focused on a common goal, and all their energy flowing in the same direction, this creates a very special concentration of power. Everyone feels it.²⁰

High-performing organizations are highly focused and synergistic. Leaders in these organizations encourage open communication, build trust, foster supportive relationships and inspire a sense of individual or collective contribution toward a common goal. Such a positive organizational climate increases the group's confidence and enhances their ability to solve any problem that may arise. Further, it engenders an environment of hopefulness, helpfulness, powerfulness: the organization can visualize possibilities and options; it is open to a change of direction; emerging solutions move beyond individual ownership and reflect the holistic abilities and contributions of the group members.²¹

Conversely, a negative organizational environment promotes a climate of hopelessness, helplessness, and powerlessness: people are denied options or possibilities, they may become uncertain, insecure, and resistant to change; their energy is focused toward rejection of the leader and the organization. Organizational members who coalesce in a negative environment frequently perform well below their capabilities.²² At a certain point, enormous energy is focused on attacking individuals, which encourages

flight or hostile behavior. Consequently, punitive action is usually taken in a desperate attempt to promote positive performance.²³

Strategic leaders should also be mindful that when people's positive efforts are ignored or neutralized by such reactions, they are not psychologically prepared for problem-solving or optimal performance. Trust levels are marginalized, and individuals tend to maintain the status quo, because it poses low risks, and allows for unmotivated job performance. Once trust is broken, it is one of the most difficult elements to restore in a relationship; without trust there can be no genuine respect or unity of effort. Let us now explore some of the challenges that strategic leaders must face in a coalition or multinational environment.

Challenges for the Joint, Multinational or Coalition Battlefield

As previously stated, coalition forces often enter the alliance with different national agendas and expectations. Therefore, strategic leaders must foster a climate of close cooperation, trust, and consensus among all nations involved to achieve a common purpose and goal. In multinational endeavors, strategic leaders should operate on a basis of partnership and mutual respect. A pervasive sense of equality helps to create a positive organizational climate. The leadership of the U.S. should provide an example of team spirit for the other nations to follow. Successful military operations in the international arena must be focused, coordinated, and synergistic. "Peacetime planning, training, and exercising with allies promotes mutual respect and teamwork." Such cooperation and rehearsal is essential to maintain the coalition's interpersonal and organizational effectiveness in peace and war.

The following quotations from Operation Desert Storm (ODS) leaders reveal the strength of the coalition:

There must be harmony among the services. The CINC said, 'I'm the concept man, you all work out the details'. That was the key to the absolute trust and confidence we had in each other and to our extremely close teamwork.²⁶

Lieutenant General John J. Yeosock

I built trust among my components because I trusted them ...²⁷

General H. Norman Schwarzkopf

The strategic leader must articulate the organizational vision and focus the alliance or coalition onto this vision to motivate them to think and act proactively to accomplish a common goal.²⁸ Now that we have examined some of the challenges in a multinational environment, let us examine the effects that organizational climate has on unit readiness and performance.

How Organizational Climate contributes to Unit Readiness and Performance

Integrative solutions enhance collective commitment, unity of effort and a positive organizational climate. Strategic leaders who encourage collaboration lay the foundation for integrative solutions.²⁹ This initiative changes peoples views from an "either/or ('or zero-sum') mentality" to a more constructive perspective on interacting as a unified team.³⁰ Unit readiness and high performance are bedrock characteristics of successful organizations. General Electric conducted a study of achievement motivation by testing several hypotheses regarding the influence of leadership style and organizational climate

on the motivation and behavior of organization members. The study involved the creation of several notional organizations. Three research objectives were established: first, to study the relationship of leadership style and organizational climate; second, to study the effects of organizational climate on individual motivation, measured through content analysis of imaginative thought; third, to identify the effects of organizational climate on such traditional variables as personal satisfaction and organizational performance.³¹
Researcher, Robert A. Stringer drew the following conclusions based on his experimental study: ³²

- (1) A major conclusion of this experimental study is that distinct organizational climates can be created by varying leadership style. Such climates can be created in a short period of time, and their characteristics are quite stable.
- (2) Once created, these climates seem to have significant, often dramatic, effects on motivation, and correspondingly on performance and job satisfaction. Each of the three experimentally induced climates aroused a different motivational pattern.
- (3) Organizational climates may effect changes to seemingly stable personality traits. This conclusion is somewhat tentative. Motive strength, as measured by a standardized thematic apperceptive instrument, was not significantly affected, but certain personality dispositions, measured through a standardized empirically validated personality test, were affected by the climate.
- (4) These findings suggest that organizational climate is an important variable in the study of human organizations. The climate concept should aid, first, in understanding the impact of organizations on the person and the personality. If significant changes in relatively stable personality factors can be created in less than two weeks, then we can imagine how living in a given climate for a period of years could dramatically affect many aspects of personal functioning, capacity for productive effort, commitment to long-term relationships, etc. An understanding of climate will aid in the study of the management process, particularly with regard to the effects different styles of management have on people, on organizational performance, and on organizational health.

Further, Hunt and Blair conclude that research conducted by Campbell,

Dunnette, Lawler and Weick (1970) suggests three reasons for the importance of
organizational climate on performance: First, "the traditional classes of major variables of
individual differences, training and development programs, and organizational rewards
have never accounted for more than half of the variability in managerial effectiveness
measures; second, research on the impact of climate has shown that regardless of how it is
operationally defined, it does influence performance; finally, they argue that there is an
appealing intuitive logic to the notion that the situation, as perceived by the individual,
affects behavior."

These studies clearly suggest that an organizations' climate does have
an impact on readiness and performance. These findings legitimize my own personal
experiences over the past twenty-three years in micro- and macro-level organizations.

When a positive organizational climate exists, it usually generates a propensity for high
level performance output.

How Strategic Leaders Build or Engineer a positive Organizational Climate

The strategic leader must create an environment where it is routine for coalition partners to willingly subordinate their self-interest to the interest of the coalition. The relationship should appear to be seamless. In <u>Forging The Heroic Organization</u>, Murphy Snell applies the heroic process to international partners. He focuses on the importance of developing good relationships to overcome the threat of self-interest. Snell believes that:

...Building heroic partnerships on the international level requires a willingness to set aside one's biases and confront arrogance head-on. Overcoming the risks inherent in bringing cultures together requires an ability to assimilate a tremendous range of different perspectives to form the

strong foundation on which bridges of empathy and understanding can be built. Such relationships demand exceptional self-discipline and a willingness to walk in a sacred manner of cooperation and interdependence, always strengthening the identities that bind disparate cultures for the benefit of all. The world stage requires a strong constancy of purpose.³⁴

As strategic leaders set out to build or engineer a positive organizational climate, they must recognize and accept the fact that the way in which an alliance or coalition is organized or operated is a reflection of the inherent cultures they bring to the situation. There are occasions when national interests and coalition goals are in conflict. The strategic leader must exhibit good interpersonal skills to bond the relationship between coalition partners, despite such differences. They must collectively define coalition objectives and goals for the well-being of coalition members. This process presents a great challenge for the U.S. strategic leader, because different practices and dissimilar personalities may lead to potential miscommunication or misunderstanding among members of the coalition. Finally, we must acknowledge that organizational climate building is a systematic or multidimensional process that consists of several variables.

The following list from <u>The Leadership Challenge</u>, by Kouzes and Posner has been modified to offer a practical framework for building a positive organizational climate:³⁵

- Building trust by fostering collaboration, and promoting cooperative goals
- Supporting reciprocity
- Sustain ongoing interactions for long-term benefits
- Focus on gains rather than losses

Share information and resources

Building trust by fostering collaboration and promoting cooperative goals

One of the most powerful means for the strategic leader to create a positive organizational climate is to build trust through collaboration. Collaboration flourishes in a climate of trust. According to Anthony J. Rucci:

If there is one thing in my mind that characterizes the really effective teams I've been involved with, its trust. It's trust at a couple of levels. You need to clearly define the expectations, leaving people with the sense that you trust them enough to do things on their own, that you trust their judgment enough to let them take personal initiative, that you are not looking over their shoulder. That is the quickest way that I know of for a manager of a team to demonstrate trust and to build a climate for trust. Beyond that, I think trust comes in most clearly in honesty, a sense of integrity in the way people deal with one another within a team.³⁶

A climate of trust and collaboration includes honesty and openness: "(1) Honesty-integrity, no lies, no exaggerations; (2) Openness-a willingness to share, and a receptivity to information, perceptions, ideas; dignity and fairness."³⁷

Trust is so sensitive that if it ever broken, the relationship may be severely damaged beyond repair. Trust is the glue that holds the fragile fibers of organizational climate together. More importantly, trust-building bridges the affinity gap and promotes positive relationships between key players in joint, multinational alliance or coalition operations. Trust is like a magnet which creates synergy and fosters a solution-oriented team. On the other hand, "the absence of trust diverts the mental concentration and energy of a team away from its performance objectives and onto other issues." During World War II, Franco-American friendship descended to hostility between the two allies because of a lack of trust. The French wanted to liberate Paris to expiate their defeat in

1940, so they were upset when their American comrades urged them to by-pass Paris as the Germans were thrust back to their homeland.³⁹ The Americans had very little confidence in the French to achieve success in urban warfare.

Strategic leaders must promulgate shared goals to bind multinational alliances or coalitions together in collaborative pursuits. As these forces work together on a corporate strategy, acknowledging a collective need for interdependence, they will become more convinced that everyone should have ownership and contribute. They believe that, by cooperating, they can accomplish the task successfully.

Strategic leaders who stress collaboration will be looked at more favorably. Moreover, when they foster collaboration to strengthen others, the coalition stakeholders assessment of the top coalition leader will increase his/her influence and credibility. The coalitions' élan will intensify-as will their own level of motivation and dedication to work as a unified team.

Mary Tjosvold found in a study conducted in a medical laboratory that "Leaders who had cooperative relationships, ... inspired commitment and were considered competent. Competitive and independent leaders, on the other hand, were seen as obstructive and ineffective."

Alliance or coalition members sometimes bring diverse or conflicting interests to the table. Therefore, collaboration is one of the most effective ways of working with alliances or coalitions.. "World-Class performances are not possible unless there is a strong sense of shared creation and responsibility." A strategic leader who can skillfully develop cooperative goals and seek integrative solutions to build trust relationships will nurture the process to develop a positive organizational climate.

Supporting Reciprocity

Webster's II New Riverside University Dictionary defines reciprocity as: "A reciprocal condition or relationship, a mutual or cooperative interchange of favors or privileges, especially the exchange of rights or privileges of trade between nations." Strategic leaders should model reciprocity to enhance healthy, enduring relationships which exhibit a sense of mutuality. They must quickly establish an organizational norm of reciprocity among joint, allied and coalition forces to develop cooperative goals.

Reciprocity enhances "predictability and stability in relationships, which can keep both relationships and negotiations from breaking down." Lack of a reciprocal relationship may lead to a lack of cooperation between allies or coalition partners; it could negatively impact the organizations' climate. Reciprocity can be achieved by exchanging liaison officers to work in the headquarters of our allies during training, actual combat operations and by instituting a one year officer exchange program. Finally, "when people understand that they have something to gain by cooperating, they are usually more inclined to recognize the legitimacy of others' interests in an effort to promote their own welfare."

Sustaining Ongoing Interactions for Long-Term Benefits

According to Axelrod, <u>The Evolution of Cooperation</u>, "The most essential strategy for eliciting cooperation is to enlarge the shadow of the future." Therefore, strategic leaders should promote mutual cooperation by citing potential future benefits to a joint, multinational or coalition environment. Leaders who align constituents through a shared vision for the future are much more likely to gain their cooperation; similar, organizational

members who foresee potential relationships in the future tend to cooperate more in the present.⁴⁶

Strategic leaders should always be mindful of the 2^d and 3rd order effects of their present actions, thereby anticipating future operational implications in a joint, multinational or coalition environment. How you treat people today will have a significant impact on the type of relationship you will experience with them in the future. The strategic leader must eliminate communication barriers between people by promoting healthy interaction across the organization.

When strategic leaders focus on enduring long-term relationships, short-term setbacks are less traumatic. The bottom line is that conditions should be established to strengthen a long-term relationship.

Focus on Gains rather than Losses

Strategic leaders should further develop integrative solutions by analyzing differences and problems through a focus on two questions: "What is to be gained? v. What is to be lost?" ⁴⁷ Kouzes and Posner indicate that the research of Phillips, Jack and Associates, suggests that people respond differently to problems framed in terms of losses than to those framed as gains. ⁴⁸ Further, researchers have found that people are more open to make workable compromises when negotiations focus on the gains to be achieved rather than on the possible costs. ⁴⁹ What does all this mean for strategic leadership? Obviously, strategic leaders will have a better opportunity to build a positive organizational climate if they focus on what is to be gained by integrative solutions.

Thinking in terms of only the negative breaks down affinity among homogeneous work groups. But negativity may be more profound with culturally diverse groups.

Share Information and Resources

U.S. strategic leaders of future coalitions or multinational operations must ensure that critical information and resources are shared. All participants bring certain individual contributions to the table. However, the mission cannot be accomplished without the total-sum of all the parts. This total-sum builds synergy. Synergy is the "breakfast of champions." Multinational partners soon realize, they must each accept and be committed to a common purpose and goal; they must willingingly share critical resources to achieve unity of effort and the greatest potential for success. ⁵⁰

When multinational organizations internalize their capacity to accomplish cooperative goals as a matter of routine, organizational norms cause them to share information, to listen actively to opposing points of views and ideas, to share resources, and to respond to each others' desires through a sense of interdependence. Thus, as strategic leaders continue to confer with key participants in multinational operations, everyone will tend to develop a level of ownership in the decision-making process. Suffice it to say, this is not a guarantee for acceptance of every decision. However, it will decrease the amount of tension or resistance in the decision-making process.

When strategic leaders solicit diverse inputs, they will establish a condition to bring all the issues to the forefront. Thus, they create an environment for openness. As strategic leaders gain knowledge of all the issues, this enables them to integrate a wider range of view points to demonstrate to others that their input is valued.⁵²

Research indicates that it takes more time in the problem-solving and decision-making process to reach high levels of performance from culturally diverse groups. Further, "homogeneous groups are likely to significantly outperform culturally diverse groups on measures of problem identification, quality of solutions, and overall performance in the initial weeks of a task." However, these differences eventually recede in the long term. Because of the nature of U.S. future military operations in a multinational environment, greater information and resource sharing must be a key operational tenet to optimize their potential for success in the problem-solving and decision making process.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This paper has examined the value or relevance of organizational climate-building in a geostrategic environment. It examined culture, culture integration, and organizational climate: Then it examined the relationship between high performing units and organizational climate; it described the challenges on the joint, multinational alliance or coalition battlefield; it demonstrated that organizational climate contributes to unit readiness and performance; it concluded with what senior leaders should do to elicit cooperation to build or engineer a positive organizational climate to integrate culture diversity. The concept of organizational climate has significant application in coalition operations.

Detailed research, clearly reveals that building a positive organizational climate is extremely important for U.S. strategic leaders, especially because future operations will use joint, multinational or coalition forces. Organizational culture-building is important, however, it is a long-term proposition. Multinational forces bring defined cultures to the

coalition. Changing a culture is as difficult as attempting to change one's value system, which has been developed over a long period of time. Therefore, it is more pragmatic for strategic leaders to focus their energies on organizational climate-building and culture integration, given the temporary, ad hoc nature of multinational operations. This dynamic process must be given top priority as we launch into the next millennium. We can no longer afford to cling to the old cliché, 'touchy feely' or ignore developing interpersonal relationships which are especially vital to effective coalition operations in peacetime and war.

With our entry into an emerging Revolution in Military Affairs, this study also suggests that greater investments must be made to better prepare future strategic leaders to meet the leadership challenges in the global environment. The recurring themes germane in this study were: mutual trust and consensus building; promoting collaboration, cooperation, interdependence, open communication and information sharing. If history is our teacher, these time-tested areas of active experimentation should serve as rallying points as strategic leaders attempt to develop a positive organizational climate with multinational forces in the 21st Century. We can no longer afford to wait until an officer has served twenty years to develop the necessary competencies to address the leadership requirements in a joint, multinational or coalition environment. A vast majority of the officers attending War Colleges have never operated at the strategic level; much less, in the multinational arena.

Recommendations

The following recommendations are provided:

- a. The Officer Professional Military Education (PME) system should be reviewed and revised to address future requirements relevant to a multinational environment.

 Specifically, Command and Staff College (CSC) level education should include more Strategic Leadership/ Strategic Art to leverage the development process. By the time most officers arrive at the War College, they have less than 10 years remaining on active duty. This early indoctrination at the CSC level would be more beneficial to the military because these officers will have more longevity. Further, this will provide them more time to master skills that will be required at the strategic level.
- b. Develop a competency recognition model linked to officer professional development over a twenty year period. This model should have a list of competencies and behavioral performance indicators to be used as a structured assessment and development tool. Enabling competencies and objectives should be linked at every Professional Military Education (PME) level to address climate-building and culture integration. Early exposure, development, and mastery would have a profound positive impact; it would eliminate the 'fire hose' approach used to develop our strategic leaders to work with or lead coalitions. This recommended approach is worth the investment because of its positive long-term benefits.
- c. Develop Military Qualification Standards (MQS) for CPT-LTC. Military Qualification Standards (I and II) were developed in the early eighties to establish a level playing field for all pre-commissioning sources and lieutenants. MQS identified specific competencies that must be mastered prior to commissionees attending the officer basic

course and during their lieutenant years. There was a proposed plan to extend MQS to other ranks, however, it was never institutionalized. If the MQS approach is implemented, it would serve as a check and balance to ensure officer development is directly linked to an expected future or end-state. Finally, this process would remove some of the ambiguity in the leader development process.

- d. Institutionalize a Distant Learning Professional Development Program (DLPDP) linked to higher level military training and education. This program should be tied to multinational operations.
- e. Conduct simulations and exercises designed to incorporate the human dimension of joint, multinational or coalition operations. Many of our current simulations and exercises tend to focus solely on war fighting (i.e. tactics and strategy).

ENDNOTES

¹Joint Publication 1, Joint Warfare of The Armed Forces of The United States, 1995, I-1.

²Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, 1995, VI-1.

³Martin Blumenson and James L. Stokesbury, <u>Masters of The Art of Command</u>, (Boston: Houghton and Company, 1975), 306.

⁴Ibid., 307.

⁵Ibid.

⁶ Personal Interview . Interviewee chose to remain anonymous , (Carlisle, PA, Dec. 1996.)

⁷Military Review, May-June 95, 33.

⁸Ken Matejka and Richard J. Dunsing, <u>A Manager's Guide To The Millennium</u>: Today's Strategies for Tomorrow's Success, (New York: American Management Association, 1995), 9.

 $^9 Course~1,~\underline{Responsible~Command,~Vol.~1}$, (U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa.,1995), 402.

¹⁰Peter B. Smith and Mark F. Peterson, Leadership, <u>Organizations and Culture</u>: An Event Management Model, California: Sage Publication Inc., 1988), 101.

¹¹Carl H. Builder, <u>The Mask Of War</u>: American Military Styles and Analysis, (Maryland: John Hopkins University Press, 1986), 125-126.

¹²Perry Smith, <u>Taking Charge</u>: A Practical Guide For Leaders, (Washington D.C: National Defense University Press, 1986), 125-126.

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Renato Tagiuri and George H. Litwin, <u>Organizational Climate</u>: Exploration of a Concept, (Mass: Division of Research, Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University, 1968), 27.

¹⁵Ibid., 85.

¹⁶Joint Publication 1, <u>Joint Warfare of The Armed Forces of the United States</u>, 1995, III-14.

¹⁷Arthur C. Beck and Ellis D. Hillmar, <u>Positive Management Practices</u>, (California: Jossey-Bass Inc. Publishers, 1986), 87.

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¹⁹Martin Blumenson and James L. Stokesbury, <u>Masters of The Art Of Command</u>, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1975), 305.

²⁰Arthur C. Beck and Ellis D. Hillmar, <u>Positive Management Practices</u>, (California: Jossey-Bass Inc. Publishers, 1986), 66.

²¹Ibid., 67.

²²Ibid., 68.

²³Ibid.

²⁴Joint Publication 1, <u>Joint Warfare of The Armed Forces of the United States</u>, 1995, III-13-14.

²⁵Ibid., A-4.

²⁶Ibid.

²⁷Ibid.

²⁸MG Richard A. Chilcoat, <u>Strategic Art</u>: The New Discipline For 21st Century Leaders, U.S. Army War College, (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, 1995), 8.

²⁹James M. Kouzes and Barry Z. Posner, <u>The Leadership Challenge</u>: How To Keep Getting Extraordinary Things Done in Organizations, (California: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1995), 160.

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³¹Renato Tagiuri and George H. Litwin, <u>Organizational Climate</u>: Exploration of a Concept (Massachusetts: Division of Research, Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University, 1968), 169.

³²Ibid., 189-190.

³³James G. Hunt and John D. Blair, <u>Leadership on the Future Battlefield</u>, (Virginia: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, 1985), 163.

³⁴Emmett C. Murphy and Michael Snell, <u>Forging The Heroic Organization</u>: A Daring Blue Print For Revitalizing American Business, (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1994), 219.

³⁵James M. Kouzes and Barry Z. Posner, <u>The Leadership Challenge</u>: How To Keep Getting Extraordinary Things Done in Organizations, (California: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1995), 140-172.

³⁶Carl E. Larson and Frank M.J. LaFasto, <u>Teamwork</u>: What Must Go Right/What Can Go Wrong, (California: Sage Publications, Inc. 1989), 87.

³⁷Ibid., 85.

³⁸Ibid., 88.

³⁹Martin Blumenson and James L. Stokesbury, <u>Masters of The Art Of Command</u>, (Boston: Houghton and Company 1975), 313.

⁴⁰Ibid., 154.

⁴¹Ibid.

⁴²Webster's II, New Riverside Dictionary, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1988), 982.

⁴³James M. Kouzes and Barry Z. Posner, <u>The Leadership Challenge</u>: How To Keep Getting Extraordinary Things Done in Organizations, (California: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1995), 157.

44Ibid.

⁴⁵Ibid.

46 Ibid.

47Ibid.

⁴⁸Ibid., The Phillips-Jack research is cited by Kouzes and Posner.

⁴⁹Ibid., 161.

50 Ibid.

⁵¹Ibid.

⁵²Ibid.

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⁵⁴Ibid.

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